This IDS WG Meeting was started at approximately 3:45 pm ET on September 22, 2022.

**Attendees**

Smith Kennedy       HP
Alan Sukert          HP
Bill Wagner          TIC
Steve Young          Canon

**Agenda Items**

1. The topics to be covered during this meeting were:
   - Review of the HCD iTC Meetings since our last IDS WG Meeting on 9/8/22
   - Review of the Security Page on the PWG web site at the request of the PWG Steering Committee (SC)
   - Round Table

2. Meeting began by stating the PWG Anti-Trust Policy which can be found at [https://www.pwg.org/chair/membership_docs/pwg-antitrust-policy.pdf](https://www.pwg.org/chair/membership_docs/pwg-antitrust-policy.pdf) and the PWG Intellectual Property Policy which can be found at [https://www.pwg.org/chair/membership_docs/pwg-ip-policy.pdf](https://www.pwg.org/chair/membership_docs/pwg-ip-policy.pdf).

3. Al provided a quick summary of what was covered at the HCD iTC Meetings since the last IDS Workgroup meeting on 9/8/22:
   - Al stated that both HCD iTC meetings since 9/8/22 were for reviewing comments against the Final Drafts of the HCD collaborative Protection Profile (cPP) and HCD Supporting Document (SD). Since the meeting was only going to be 45 minutes, Al focused on two of the comments the HCD iTC reviewed against the HCD SD:
     - The first was a comment from Oleg Andrianov of UL Solutions against the Test Assurance Activities for the FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction SFR. The particular comment had to do with one of the test steps in one of the test cases for this SFR not being clearly stated as to what testing the evaluator was supposed to perform for this test step. The specifics aren’t important here; what made this comment interesting is that this particular SFR was one that was taken and used “as is” from the Full Disk Encryption (FDE) Authorization Acquisition (AA) cPP.
       
       It turns out that the wording for this particular test case was required by two NIAP Technical Decisions (TDs) against the FDE AA cPP. The HCD iTC eventually agreed with Oleg’s comment, but since the specific wording was dictated by two NIAP TDs the iTc felt we couldn’t unilaterally change it. So, the solution that was suggested by our NIAP representative was that we follow the NIAP Technical Rapid Response Team (TRRT) process to submit a comment to NIAP against this Test Case for FCS_CKM.1 so that NIAP can issue a new TD superseding the previous two TDs with better wording as to what is to be tested for this test case. The only down side is that the TRRT process will likely not be completed in time for the change to get into HCD SD v1.0, so this will become a Parking Lot issue to get into the next version of the HCD SD.
     - The second comment was from the Japan Information Technology Security Center (ITSC) and also against the Test Assurance Activities for the FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction SFR. In this particular case there was a mention of a ‘selection a)’ and ‘selection b)’ in one of the test cases, but no indication as to what they refer to. The ITSC proposed a solution to the issue, but during the discussion we found out that the same comment had been brought to the FDE iTC Interpretation Team (FIT) and they had developed a solution for this issue that they were about to issue as a TD (Note: See the minutes from the 9/8/22 IDS WG Meeting for a discussion of what an Interpretation Team is). The HCD iTC decided that,
subject to the OK from the ITSC, we would go with the FIT’s solution to this issue so that we could maintain consistency across cPPs.

What both comments had in common is that they emphasize a point AL has mentioned at several of his presentations at IDS Face to Face sessions – that syncing with the FDE and Network Device cPPs/SDs is something that the HCD iTC has to constantly be aware of as NIAP TSDs are issued or as new versions of these cPPs/SDs are published.

4. We then went through a review of the Security Page on the PWG web site at http://www.pwg.org/security. It was a good discussion and the key comments from the discussion were:

- The general feeling was that the current page was too IPP-centric and needed to be broadened to cover other topics beyond IPP and to include IDS-related topics. For example, it was mentioned that TRUSTNOONE would only be known by someone familiar with IPP.
- The page needs to reflect all the different types of organizations that the PWG is supporting like the Common Criteria.
- This web page should indicate the security-related value proposition that the PWG is providing to these other organizations.
- “Security is universal”, so we should show on this page how what the PWG is doing with respect to security applies to printing
- Show how the PWG is involved in all aspects of security even though the PWG might not have a specific document or standard associated with every aspect.

There were suggestions how to include some IDS specific topics onto the Security Page. A couple of them were:

- Add wording about the work IDS is doing supporting the HCD cPP development onto the list
- Add some wording about the work Al and Paul Tykodi are doing to expand the development of Common Criteria security certifications for 2D printers to develop Common Criteria security certifications for 3D printers

5. There was no Round Table for today’s meeting

6. **Actions:** None

**Next Steps**

- The next IDS WG Meeting will be October 6, 2022 at 3:00P ET / 12:00N PT. Main topics will be review of the HCD iTC Meetings since this IDS WG meeting and a special topic (AI suggested a review of the planned changes to the Common Criteria standard that are due to be released the end of 2022 since they are significant).